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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an action initiated by AgriSource, Inc. (AgriSource) seeking to recover damages 
for breach of contract against Robert Johnson (Johnson) and other Defendants. Johnson did not 
deny that the contract was breached nor contest the amount of damages; rather, Johnson's 
primary defense is that he is not personally liable for the damages because at the time of contract, 
he claims that he acted as an agent. Summary judgment was entered against AgriSource and in 
favor of the other Defendants, including Johnson Grain, Inc., Johnson's purported principal, 
dismissing them from AgriSource's action. Summary judgment was entered against Johnson in 
favor of AgriSource for the damages incurred by AgriSource. Johnson filed three (3) motions for 
reconsideration of the order granting summary judgment and a motion for relief from judgment, 
all of which were denied. 
Johnson appeals from the Judgment entered by the Court, as well as the denial of 
Johnson's post judgment motions. 
Course of Proceedings Below 
The course of proceedings below set forth in Johnson's Brief did not include the 
follO\ving: 
- Memorandum of Plaintiff in Opposition to Johnson's Motion for Summary Judgment 
and in Reply to Johnson's Response, dated March 16,2012, attached as Exhibit A to 
AgriSource's Unopposed Motion to Augment. 
- Plaintifrs Response to Motion for Reconsideration and Objection, dated May 16, 2012, 
attached as Exhibit B to AgriSource's Unopposed Motion to Augment. 
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- Plaintiffs Response to Second Motion for Reconsideration, dated August 6, 2012, 
attached as Exhibit C to AgriSource's Unopposed Motion to Augment. 
- Plaintiffs Response to J ohnsons' Amended Third Motion for Reconsideration and 
Alternative Motion for Relief under Rule 60(b) and Objections to Affidavits, dated October 1, 
2012, attached as Exhibit D to AgriSource's Unopposed Motion to Augment. 
In addition, Johnson's Course of Proceedings Below does not mention that Johnson's 
counsel filed an Affidavit of Counsel to Augment Record dated December 10, 2012, R Vol. II, 
pp. 376-386 and attached as Exhibit A to AgriSource's Motion to Remove, and that AgriSource 
filed an Objection to Affidavit of Counsel to Augment Record and Motion to Strike dated 
December 13, 2012, attached as Exhibit F to AgriSource's Unopposed Motion to Augment. 
Statement of the Facts 
AgriSource asserts that the following material facts are uncontroverted and entitle 
AgriSource to judgment as a matter oflaw: 
In 2006, Johnson opened an account at AgtiSource. When it was opened, the account 
was opened in the name of "Johnson Grain." R Vol. I,pp.168-169, 174. 
On November 8, 2006, Johnson entered into a contract with AgriSource. The contract 
was sigt1ed by "Johnson Grain by Rob J." as seller. All grain described in the contract was 
delivered and payment was made to "Johnson Grain." R Vol. I, pp. 168-170, 176, 178. 
On December 13, 2006, Johnson entered into a contract with AgriSource in which 
Johnson sold 50,000 bushels of Durum to AgriSource. Johnson did not object to the terms of the 




Johnson delivered all Durum required by the December contract and was paid by 
AgriSource. R Vol. I, pp. 168, 170. 
Johnson entered into another contract with AgriSource dated January 12, 2007, agreeing 
to sell to AgriSource 50,000 bushels of Durum. Johnson did not object to the terms of the 
contract and signed the contract "Johnson Grain by Rob Johnson" as seller. R Vol. I, pp. 168, 
170-171,222,224. 
Johnson breached the contract and failed to deliver 15,527.87 bushels ofDurum. R Vol. 
I, pp. 168, 171-172. 
Johnson has not appealed the finding of breach of the contract, nor has Johnson appealed 
the amount of damages awarded. For infolmational purposes, AgriSource was required to cover 
the contract and the cost of cover exceeded the January contract price by $3.30 per bushel, 
resulting in AgriSource incurring damages in the amount of $51 ,24l.97. See, generally, R Vol. I, 
pp. 168-227 and R Vol. II, pp. 228-235. 
There is no evidence in the record that Johnson ever advised anyone at AgriSource that he 
was the agent for a corporation known as "Johnson Grain, Inc." Rather. following breach of the 
contract, Johnson advised Scott R. Mallory, an employee of AgriSource that "Johnson Grain was 
Neil Brown's company" and that Johnson was acting as an agent for "Johnson Grain." The only 
source for this information was Johnson. R Vol. II, pp. 228-229. 
The first time that Johnson ever mentioned to Kirk Carpenter, another employee of 
AgriSource, that Neil Brown was involved in the transaction was after the contract was breached. 
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At that time, Johnson asked Kirk Carpenter if AgriSource "would be willing to transfer the 
contract to Neil Brown." R Vol. I, pp. 168, 17l. 
Johnson admits that he cannot recall ever telling anyone at AgriSource that he was acting 
as an agent for "Johnson Grain, Inc." Johnson asserts that he "did tell them [AgriSource ] that 
Johnson Grain \-vas Neil's company" but does not set forth any foundation for this statement as to 
the date or time the statement was made. R Vol. II, pp. 259, 26l. 
There is nothing in the record demonstrating that Neil Brown or any other officer or 
owner of "Johnson Grain, Inc." advised AgriSource that Johnson had authority to contract on 
behalf of "Johnson Grain, Inc." 
Jolmson asserts that "AgriSource stated in an email that it knew Johnson was acting as 
agent for Brown's corp." Johnson's Brief~ p. 16. It then cites "Clerk's Record, Vol. II, pp. 113-
114." It is believed that this is an error and that Johnson was attempting to cite R Vol. I, pp. 113, 
137 and R Vol. II, pp. 228, 233. In any case, Johnson misstates what the email says. The email 
does not state that AgriSource "knew Johnson was an agent for Brown's corporation"; rather, the 
email says that the contract was not filled "by Neil Brown, dba Johnson Grain which Rob 
Johnson was the acting agent for the company." There is no mention of a corporation in this 
email. Further, Johnson's Brief fails to mention that this email was sent by Scott Mallory, 
employee of AgriSource, after breach of the contract, was based upon statements made by 




In Johnson's Brief, pp. 10-11, Johnson also asserts that Johnson "believes he told 
AgriSource prior to and during the contract discussion period in November through December, 
2006 that he was working for Brown's corp." and cites to R Vol. I, pp. 79-83. The citation is to 
an Affidavit of Johnson dated January 11, 2012. There is no statement contained in that 
Affidavit alleging that Johnson told AgriSource that Johnson was acting as an agent for Johnson 
Grain, Inc. 
In support of his argument that he properly disclosed his agency, Johnson makes 
conclusory statements in Johnson's Brief~ p. 15, that do not reflect what is in the court record. 
* "Robert Johnson told AgriSource that he was working for Neil 
Brown's company, Johnson Grain. Johnson Grain may have told 
AgriSource that he was working for Johnson Grain, Inc." In 
support of these statements, Johnson cites R Vol. I, pp. 79-80; and 
Vol. II, pp. 259-262. 
The first cite is to Robert Johnson's Affidavit dated January 11, 2012. There is no 
statement contained on pages 79 or 80 that Johnson advised AgriSource that he "was working for 
Neil Brown's company, Johnson Grain." Rather, Johnson admits in paragraphs 20 and 21 of the 
Affidavit that "AgriSource's contract listed Johnson Grain as the party" on two different 
contracts and in paragraph 22, Johnson admits that he "accepted those commodity contracts" 
from AgriSource. R Vol. T, p. 8l. 
The second cite is to the Second Affidavit of Robert Johnson. It should be noted that 
AgriSource objected to many portions of this affidavit on the grounds it did not set forth facts 
that would be admissible in evidence. l.R.C.P. 56(e); See AgriSource's Unopposed Motion to 
Augment, Exhibit B, pp. 2-3. No where in that Affidavit does Johnson state that he "may have 
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told AgriSource that he was working for Johnson Grain, Inc." Rather, in that Affidavit, Johnson 
states in paragraph 10 that he told an employee of AgriSource that Johnson "was operating the 
elevator for him [Neil Brown]." R Vol. II, p. 260. Johnson also asserts that he told 
representatives of AgriSource to make checks "payable to Neil's company, Johnson Grain." R 
Vol. II, p. 261. Most importantly, in paragraph 16 of that Affidavit, Johnson does not state that 
Johnson "may have told AgriSource that he was working for Johnson Grain, Inc." , but rather 
admits that "I do not recall if I specifically told them the company's name was Johnson Grain, 
Inc., but I did tell them that Johnson Grain was Neil's company." R Vol. II, p. 261. There is 
nothing in the record to show that Johnson was an agent for either Neil Bro\yn or "Johnson 
Grain." There is nothing in the record to show that Neil Brown owned a company called 
"Johnson Grain." Johnson attempts to minimize the distinction between the name "Johnson 
Grain" and the true name of the corporation that Johnson alleges was the principal, "Johnson 
Grain, Inc." As is argued below, this distinction is significant and defeats Johnson's arguments. 
* Johnson argues that Johnson told AgriSource that "Neil Brown's 
company was not yet licensed and could not execute commodity 
contracts." Again, Johnson cites his Second Affidavit, R Vol. II, 
pp. 259-262. 
The actual statement contained in paragraph 10 of the Affidavit states "I explained that 
Neil Brown has purchased the elevator and I was operating the elevator for him, but told both 
Bill and Scott that the company had not yet received its license as a commodity dealer." R. Vol. 
II, p. 260. If Johnson was making a disclosure of agency, he was disclosing that he was an agent 
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for Neil Brown, not Johnson Grain, Inc. There is no evidence that Johnson was ever an agent for 
Neil Brown. 
* Johnson's Brief, page 15, asserts "after Johnson Grain, Inc. 
received its commodity license in November, 2003 Johnson then 
informed AgriSource of the company's licensure and ability to 
contract." In support of this statement, Johnson cites to his First 
and Second Affidavits. 
An examination of his First Affidavit, R Vol. I, pp. 79-83, shows that it contains no such 
statement. 
An examination of the Second Affidavit, R Vol. II, pp. 259-262, also contains no such 
statement. The actual statement in the Second Affidavit, paragraph 20, states "in separate 
conversations with Bill and Scott [employees of AgriSource ] as early as October, 2006 they each 
asked about entering into commodity contracts. I remember telling them that the company had 
not yet been licensed as a commodity dealer and could not contract." R Vol. II, p. 261. In 
paragraph 24 of the Second Affidavit, Johnson states "once the commodity and warehouse 
licensing requirements were completed, I spoke with Bill and Scott on various days in late 
November, 2006 and early December, 2006 concerning Dumm wheat contracts." R Vol. II, p. 
261. Contrary to Johnson's assertion, there is no statement contained in either Affidavit that 
Johnson told anyone at AgriSource that Johnson Grain, Inc. had received a commodity license 
and that Johnson Grain, Inc. had the ability to contract. 
Most surprisingly, in Johnson's Second Affidavit, he then goes on to state, in paragraph 
25, "after those conversations, AgriSource sent commodity contracts to Jolmson Grain to be 
signed." In paragraph 26 he states "I signed those contracts as agent for Johnson Grain as listed 
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on AgriSource's contract." R Vol. II, p. 26l. Contrary to other assertions made by Johnson, in 
this Affidavit he is admitting that the commodity contracts were sent to "Johnson Grain" and 
claims that he signed them as an agent for "Johnson Grain", and does not mention Johnson 
Grain, Inc. 
Johnson summarizes additional facts in Johnson's Brief, pp. 22-23, that do not reflect 
what is in the court record nor do they support his position that he advised AgriSource that he 
was acting as an agent for Johnson Grain, Inc. 
* "AgriSource knew prior to August, 2006 that Neil Brown was 
purchasing the Ririe elevator from vVydell Johnson and Robert 
Johnson would be managing the elevator for Brown." 
It is true that in his Second Affidavit and in the Affidavit of his father, Johnson asserts 
that he told AgriSource that he "would be managing the elevator for Brown." Contrary to 
supporting Johnson's position, this is another admission by Jolmson that he did not tell 
AgriSource that he was an agent for Johnson Grain, Inc. 
* "After August 1, 2006 and prior to the January, 2007 contract 
AgtiSource knew Neil Brown has purchased the Ririe elevator." 
It is true that Johnson asserts that he told AgriSource that Neil Brown was purchasing the 
Ririe elevator. However, this is another admission by Johnson that he did not disclose an agency 
relationship with Johnson Grain, Inc. 
* "After August 1,2006 and prior to December, 2006 AgriSource's 
agents Bill MendenhalL Scott Mallory, Mike Allen, and Bruce 
Beck had knowledge that Robert Johnson was managing the 
elevator for Neil Brown." 
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Even if this statement were true, the fact that Bill Mendenhall, Scott Mallory, Mike Allen, 
and Bruce Beck "had knowledge that Robert Johnson was managing the elevator for Neil 
Brown" would not support Johnson's position. Johnson's position in this action is that he was an 
agent for Johnson Grain, Inc. There is no evidence in the record to support an allegation that 
Johnson was acting as an agent for Neil Brown. 
* "Johnson Grain, Inc., from September through December, 2006 
sent its invoices containing its preprinting corporate name together 
with elevator and train car logs to AgriSource for payment." In 
support of this allegation, Johnson cites to his first Affidavit, R 
Vol. T, pp. 79-83, the Affidavit of David Brown, an accountant, and 
a report prepared by David Brown, R Vol. I, pp. 110, 112a-112h, 
112zz, Johnson's Second Affidavit, R Vol. II, pp. 259-262, an 
Affidavit of Jeanne Harris, a former employee of Neil Brown, R 
Vol. II, pp. 327e, and the Third Affidavit of Johnson, R Vol. II, pp. 
344-349,351,354, and 358. 
In the tIrst Affidavit of Jolmson, there is no statement pertaining to Johnson Grain, Inc. 
sending invoices together with elevator and train car logs to AgriSource. In the Affidavit of 
David Smith and the accompanying report, there is also no such statement. The exhibit cited by 
Johnson, R Vol. I, p. 112zz, is a contract entered into between Johnson Grain, Inc. and "Brown's 
Antelope Neil Brown" dated February 5,2007. AgriSource is not a party to this contract and the 
contract was entered into after the date of the January, 2012 contract entered into between 
Johnson and AgriSource. 
The Second Affidavit of Johnson contains no statement about mailing Johnson Grain, 
Inc. invoices, elevator logs or train car logs to AgriSource. In paragraph 16 of the Affidavit, 
Johnson asserts that he told representatives of AgriSource "to make the checks payable to Neil's 
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company, Johnson Grain" and goes on to admit that he cannot recall ifhe ever told them that the 
name of the company was Johnson Grain, Inc. R VoL II, p. 261. 
The Affidavit of Jeanne Harris was not considered by the court since the court determined 
that it was not properly filed for the purposes of a motion for reconsideration and that Johnson 
had not established proper grounds to file it in support of a motion to set aside judgment, 
discussed below. Even if the court had considered the Affidavit, it does not support Johnson's 
position. In her Affidavit, Ms. Harris asserts that she answered the phone "Johnson Grain" not 
Johnson Grain, Inc. R Vol. II, p. 327e. She asselis that scale tickets were printed with the 
business name "Johnson Grain, Inc." and that the fax machine would insert the name "Johnson 
Grain, Inc." on any fax sent from the office. She also said that a warehouse log "had the name 
Johnson Grain, Inc." However, Ms. Harris states, without any foundation "as I recall, the scale 
tickets and the train car logs \vould be sent to AgriSource by mail or by fax." R Vol. II, p. 327e. 
Not only does her statement lack certainty, there is no statement of when a scale ticket or train 
car log was sent to AgriSource and no reference to any record that would indicate the date that 
any of these items were delivered to AgriSource. 
Ms. Harris goes on the admit that when AgriSource paid a bill, it paid by check made out 
to "Johnson Grain", not Johnson Grain, Inc. R Vol. II, p. 327e. 
* "AgriSource from September through December, 2006 made 
checks payable to Johnson Grain for storage and shipping costs 
incurred for Agti Source's gt"ain." 
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This statement does not support Johnson's position. The checks were not made payable 
to "Johnson Grain, Inc.", but rather were made to the name used by Johnson when contracting 
with AgriSource - "Johnson Grain." 
The final cite for this statement by Johnson is to Johnson's Third Affidavit. The Third 
Affidavit was filed by Johnson in support of Johnson's Third Motion for Reconsideration and 
Motion for Relief from Judgment but was not considered by the court for the same reasons Ms. 
Harris' Affidavit was not considered. The Affidavit repeats some of the statements made by Ms. 
Harris concerning scale tickets and train car logs printed with the business name "Johnson Grain, 
Inc." and describes six (6) "original invoices from Johnson Grain, Inc. to AgriSource." R Vol. II, 
p.345. 
When addressing the scale tickets, in paragraph 6 of his Third Affidavit, Johnson asserts 
"copies of the scale tickets would be kept to show the actual amount of grain received from a 
farmer and applied to the account of that fanner and any grain purchaser such as AgriSource." R 
Vol. II, p. 345 (emphasis added). Later, Johnson asserts "copies of the train car logs and copies 
ofthe scale tickets would be provided to AgriSource." R Vol. II, p. 346. Johnson goes on to 
state "1 believe that invoice was sent to AgriSource, Inc." Again, these statements lack 
fuundation and do not establish that any of these documents were ever provided to AgriSource. 
Johnson fails to state when or how these documents were delivered or sent to AgriSource. Later 
in the Affidavit, Johnson attempts to establish that AgriSource paid one of the invoices, but 
cannot find any check that ties to any invoice referenced by Johnson. R Vol. II, p. 346. ("The 
deposit amount differs from the invoice amount by $63.99. I have no explanation for that 
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difference other than an adjustment by AgriSource."). :Kone of the invoices referenced by 
Johnson have any indication ofho\'l they were delivered to AgriSource and the invoice attached 
as Exhibit H to the Affidavit, R Vol. II, p. 358, does not state a date or address. 
* "All of AgriSources's payment checks were endorsed with a 
stamp for Johnson Grain, Inc. and deposited into the business 
account as Johnson Grain, Inc." 
This assertion made be true, but has nothing to do with disclosing agency to AgriSource. 
* "AgriSource in July, August, and September, 2006 made 
arrangements \'lith Neil Brown to store grain at the Ririe elevator. 
In support ofthis statement, Johnson cites to Johnson's Third 
Affidavit and the Affidavit of Johnson's father, Wydell Johnson." 
There is no statement contained in Robert Johnson's Second Affidavit concerning 
AgriSource making arrangements \vith Neil Bro\vn to store grain at the Ririe elevator. R Vol. II, 
p.259. There is no statement in the Affidavit of\Vydell Johnson stating AgriSource in July, 
August, and September, 2006 made arrangements with :Keil Brown to store grain at the Ririe 
elevator. R Vol. II, pp. 300-304. The only statement in Wydell Johnson's Affidavit concerning 
any discussion between Neil Brown and representatives of AgriSource is contained in paragraph 
25: "On one occasion in late July or early August, 2006 Mendenhall [an employee of 
AgriSource] came personally to the Ririe elevator. He and I were sitting in the office when 
Brown came into the offIce. All three of us discussed Brown's purchase of the Ririe elevator. 
Mendenhall and Brown spoke about AgriSource's contract with local farmers and the storage of 
grain for AgriSource at the elevator." There is no mention in this paraf,'raph of AgriSource 
making any arrangements with Neil Brown to store grain at the Ririe elevator nor is there is any 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
P.12 
mention in this paragraph that Neil Brown told AgriSource that Robert Johnson would be an 
agent for Johnson Grain, Inc. 
* "Scott Mallory of AgriSource admitted that Robert Johnson was 
an agent of Neil Brown. Mallory makes no statement in his email 
admission that he learned of J olmson' s agency only after the 
contract at issue." In support of this asseliion, Johnson cites an 
email attached to the Affidavit of Johnson's counsel. R Vol. I, p. 
113, Exhibit B. 
Exhibit B to the subject affidavit appears to be a printout of a Idaho Secretary of State's 
record pertaining to "B & J Elevators, Inc." and Annual Report filed by B & J Elevators, Inc. in 
August,2006. It is believed that Johnson was attempting to cite to Exhibit C of that Affidavit, 
which was an email dated January 29, 2009 sent by Scott Mallory, an employee of AgriSource, to 
Johnson. R Vol. I, p. 137. If that is the case, Johnson misstates the record concerning this 
assertion. 
In his affidavit, Scott Mallory addresses this email. RVol.II, pp. 228-231. Contrary to 
Johnson's assertion, in paragraph of his affidavit, Mallory states "Robert Johnson did not ever 
advise me that Jolmson Grain was a corporation. Rather, following the breach, he indicated that 
Neil Brown was doing business as Johnson Grain and that Robert Johnson was acting as an agent 
for Johnson Grain. The only source for this infonnation \vas Robert Johnson." R Vol. II, p. 229. 
(emphasis added). 
In paragraph 6 of his affidavit Mallory goes on to state "On January 27, 2009, I sent an 
email to Robcrt Johnson, attached as Exhibit 1, repeating in effect what Robcli Johnson has told 
mc about the ownership ofJohnson Grain." R Vol. II, p. 230. 
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Based upon the affidavit and the wording of the email, Mallory was told by Johnson that 
the entity AgriSource should be dealing with is "Neil Brown, d.b.a. Johnson Grain, which Robert 
Johnson was the acting agent for the company." There is nothing in the record showing Neil 
Brown was doing business as Johnson Grain. The only documents in the record signed by 
"Johnson Grain" were signed by Johnson. 
STANDARD OF REVIE\V 
The standard of review on appeal from an order granting summary judgment is the same 
standard that is used by the district court in ruling on the motion. Gibson v. Ada County, 142 
Idaho 746, 751,133 P.3d 1211, 1216 (2006). 
Summary Judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." LR.C.P. 56( c). 
Immaterial issues of fact do not preclude the granting of summary judgment. JR. Simplot 
Co. v. Dosen, 144 Idaho 611, 615, 167 P.3d 748,752 (2006). Conclusory assertions unsupported 
by specific facts do not create a genuine issue of material fact, kfareci v. Coeur d 'Alene School 
Dist. No. 27 f, 150 Idaho 740, 744250 P.3d 791,795 (2011), nor does a mere scintilla of contrary 
evidence. Wattenbarger v. A.G. Edwards and Sons. Inc., 150 Idaho 308, 317, 246 P.3d 961, 970 
(2010). In the absence of genuine disputed issues of material fact, only a question of law 
remains, and the court exercises free review. Stuard ,'. Jorgenson, 150 Idaho 701, 704, 249 P.3d 
1156, 1159 (20] 1 ). 
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When reviewing the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for relief, the Court must examine: (l) 
whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial 
court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards 
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its 
decision by an exercise of reason. Where non-discretionary grounds are asserted, the question 
presented is one oflaw, upon which the court exercises free review. Berg v. Kendall, 147 Idaho 
571,576,212 P.3d 1001, 1006 (2009). 
ADDITIONAL ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Is AgriSource entitled to an award of attorney's fees pursuant to the provisions of1.C. §§ 
12-120(3),12-121, and LA.R. 41? 
ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL 
AgriSource requests an award of attorney's fees pursuant to the provisions ofLC. §§ 12-
120 and 12-121. 1. e. § 12-120(3) compels an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party in 
any action to recover "in a commercial transaction." There is no dispute that this case involved a 
commercial transaction; this fact is ackno\vledged by Johnson when Jolmson also asserts a right 
to an award of at tomey's fees pursuant to the provisions ofLe. § 12-120(3). Since the 
underlying transaction involved in this case \vas not made for personal or household purposes, 
but rather was a business/commercial transaction, AgriSource is entitled to an award of fees 
based upon I.e. § 12-120(3). Blimka v. 11{v Web rVlzolesaler. LLC, 143 Idaho 723,728,152 P.3d 
594, 599 (2007). 
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In addition, if the Court determines that Johnson is merely asking this Court to second 
guess the trial court, AgriSource is clearly the prevailing party, the appeal would be frivolous, 
unreasonable and without foundation, and Johnson would be entitled to an award of attorney's 
fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121. 
ARGUsIENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRi\NTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Johnson argues that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment. Although 
Johnson in his testimony admitted that he could not recall telling AgriSource that Johnson was 
acting as an agent for Johnson Grain, Inc., Johnson argues that there are facts that would support 
inferences that Johnson was acting as an agent and therefore AgriSource knew that Johnson was 
acting as an agent. 
Johnson also argues that Johnson's Third Motion for Reconsideration was not properly 
considered by the Court and that the Judgment entered by the Court and certified as final on June 
14,2012 was not a Final Judgment for the purposes of calculating deadlines and the timeliness 
for the filing of a motion for reconsideration. 
In making his arguments concerning disclosure of agency, Johnson misstates the Idaho 
standard concerning disclosure of agency and relies upon facts that should not be considered by 
the Court, since many of the facts relied upon by Johnson lack proper foundation to be 
considered pursuant to LR.C.P. 56(e). There are no facts in the record indicating that Jolmson or 
any other person disclosed to AgriSource that Johnson was acting as an agent for Johnson Grain, 
Inc. There are no facts in the record showing that anyone \vith authority at Johnson Grain, Inc. 
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communicated to AgriSource that 10hnson was acting as an agent for that corporation at the time 
the contract at issue was entered into. There being no express authority established by 10hnson, 
10hnson apparently is arguing that 10hnson had apparent authority to act on behalf of 10hnson 
Grain, Inc. Apparent authority cannot be established by the statements of the agent alone. 
10hnson argues that 10hnson's Third Motion for Reconsideration was rejected by the 
Court as being "untimely." This is a misstatement of the trial court's findings. The trial court 
did not rule that the Third Motion for Reconsideration was untimely; rather, the trial court ruled 
that LR.C.P. 1 1 (a)(2) did not apply due to the fact that the judgment entered on lune 14, 2012 
was a final judgment and reconsideration can only be requested of an interlocutory order. 
However, even if the trial court is incorrect in this detennination, the filing of the Third Motion 
for Reconsideration and materials filed in support of the Motion was untimely and should not 
have been considered by the Court. 
The ludgment certified as final by the trial court on lune 14, 2012 is a final judgment as 
defined by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
If 10hnson was an Agent 10hnson did not Disclose his Principal as Required bv Law 
As can be seen from an examination of 10hnson's assertions, the facts in the record do not 
support the assertions made in 10hnson's Brief. Rather, when one examines the actual facts that 
are alleged, it supports AgriSource's position that 10hnson never established that he was an agent 
for 10hnson Grain, Inc. and that ifhe was an agent, AgriSource was never told that 10hnson was 
an agent for 10hnson Grain. Inc. At all times material to this dispute, Johnson believed it was 
contracting with 10hnson. 
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Johnson's position is that, because he claims that he told AgriSource that he was an agent 
or acting for someone (Neil Brown, Neil Brown's corporation, the elevator), the disclosure was 
sufficient to comply with Idaho law and that he should not be held personally liable for the 
damages in this action. This position is contrary to well settled Idaho law. 
A person contracting with another as an agent is liable as a party to the contract unless he 
discloses, at or before the time of entering into the contract, the agency relationship and the 
identity of the principal. Western Seeds, Inc. v. Bartu, 109 Idaho 70, 71, 704 P.2d 974, 975 (Ct. 
App. 1985) (emphasis added). A principal is disclosed if, at the time of making the contract in 
question, the other party to it has notice that the agent is acting for a principal and of the 
principal's identitv. General i'vfotors Acceptance Corp. v. Turner Ins. Agency, Inc., 96 Idaho 
691, 697, 535 P.2d 664,670 (1975) (emphasis added). The statements of a purported agent alone 
do not create an agency relationship and do not establish the authority of the agent. Hieb 1'. 
jVfinnesota Farmers Union, 105 Idaho 694, 672 P.2d 572 (Ct. App. 1983). It is a basic principal 
that an agent who enters into a contract on behalf of a corporation, but who neither discloses his 
agency nor the existence of the corporation to the third party, becomes personally liable to that 
third party. Inter/ode Constructors v. Bryant, 132 Idaho 443, 447, 974 P.2d 89, 93 (Ct. App. 
1999). 
The Interlode Constructors case has similar facts to the case at hand. Bryant, the 
manager of a corporation, both through his personal representations and through his agent, 
Pearson, dealt with Interloc1e as "Bryant and Associates," failing to reveal a corporate existence. 
Bryant led Interlode into believing it was dealing "vith Bryant individually. At all times relevant, 
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lnterlode was ignorant of the corporation's existence. The Court went on to hold that the District 
Court was correct in holding Bryant personally liable for the obligation incurred. Interlode 
Constructors v. Bryant, 132 Idaho 443447,974 P.2d 89,93 (Ct. App. 1999). 
The party asserting agency as a defense to personal liability on a contract bears the burden 
of showing that the principal was adequately disclosed. Keller Lorenz Co. v. Ins. Assocs. Corp., 
98 Idaho 678, 570 P.2d 1366 (1997). 
The duty of the agent to disclose must also be weighed in light of the duties placed upon 
Johnson by the Uniform Commercial Code and the applicable grain trade rules. Idaho Code § 
28-2-201 (1) requires that a contract for the sale of goods in excess of $500.00 must be evidenced 
by a writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the parties and 
signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker. 
Once a contract is reached, if it is between merchants, a writing con tinning the contract is 
sufficient if the \vritten confirmation is sent within a reasonable time and the party receiving it 
has reason to know its contents. In such cases, if there is an objection to the tenlls, a party must 
give ten (10) days written notice of objection to its contents after a written confirmation is 
received. I.e. § 28-2-201 (2). 
In this case, I.e. § 28-2-201(1) was satisfied since the contract is in the name of Johnson 
Grain and was signed by Johnson. Johnson admits that Johnson did not object to the terms ofthe 
contract. 
The NGF A grain trade rules are even more specific. NGF A Grain Trade Rule 3 requires 
both the buyer and seller to send a written confil111ation not later than the close of the business 
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day following the date of the trade. Upon receipt of the confirmation, the parties shall carefully 
check all specifications and upon finding any material differences, shall immediately notify the 
other party to the contract, by telephone, and confirm by written communication. If either the 
buyer or the seller fails to send a confirmation, the confirmation sent by the other party will be 
binding upon both parties, unless the confirming party has been immediately notified by the non-
confirming party of any disagreement with the confirmation received. NGF A Grain Trade Rule 
3(A) and (B), R Vol. I, pp. 168, 172,226-227. 
Obviously the names of the parties to the contract is a material term of the contract. If 
Johnson believed that the name on the contract was improper, since the stated name was not 
Johnson Grain, Inc., Johnson had a duty to so notify AgriSource. It is uncontroverted that 
Johnson did not object to any of the terms of the contract. 
An analysis of the facts relied upon by Johnson in supporting his contention that he 
disclosed his agency with Johnson Grain, Inc. is set forth in the Statement of the Facts section of 
this Brief. 1t is clear from an analysis of the facts, including Johnson's own affidavits, that he 
never disclosed to AgriSource that he as was acting as an agent for Johnson Grain, Inc. This 
failure to disclose agency hurt AgriSource in AgriSource' s attempts to recover against the other 
Defendants. The trial court found that since AgriSource was never advised or infonned of an 
agency relationship between Johnson and any other entity, did not believe an agency relationship 
existed, and was unaware of any purported agency with Johnson Grain, Inc. until after the breach 
of contract, it f0l111ed pari of the basis for the trial court entering summary judgment against 
AgriSource in favor of Johnson Grain, Inc. R Vol. II, p. 247. 
RESPONDENT'S BRlEF 
P. 20 
Although Johnson admits that he cannot recall ever advising AgriSource that he was the 
agent for Johnson Grain, Inc., he attempts to argue that he partially disclosed that agency by 
stating that he was the agent for Neil Brown or Neil Brown's corporation. A partially disclosed 
principal does not relieve the agent from liability. A person contracting with another for a 
partially disclosed principal is liable as a party to the contract. Keller Lorenz Co. v. Ins. Assocs. 
Corp., 98 Idaho 678, 570 P.2d 1366 (1977); RESTATEMENT (Second) OF AGENCY § 321 
(1957). 
The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of proving that no genuine 
issue of material fact exists. Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 873,204 P.3d 508, 513 (2009). 
Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the burden 
then shifts to the non-moving party. Kiebert v. Goss, 144 Idaho 225, 228, 159 P.3d 862, 865 
(2007). In order to survive a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must show 
that there is a triable issue. G & JV[ Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 524, 808 P .2d 
851, 861 (1991). A complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving 
party's case necessary renders all other facts immaterial. }.;fcGilvray v. Farmers NeH' World Life 
Ins. Co., 136 Idaho 39,42,28 P.3d 380,383 (2001). The non-moving party's case must be 
anchored in something more than speculation; a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create 
a genume Issue. Corbridge v. Clark Equip. Co., 112 Idaho 85, 87, 730 P.2d 960,963 (1994). 
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In this case, AgriSource established the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The 
burden then shifted to Johnson requiring Johnson to show that there existed a triable fact. 
Johnson completely failed to prove two essentials elements of his case - that he was an agent for 
Johnson Grain, Inc. and that he properly disclosed that agency. By failing to prove these 
essential elements, all other facts were rendered immaterial. 
Johnson's reliance upon decisions from mid-western states is misplaced. Idaho law is 
clear concerning the duty of the agent to properly disclose his principal. Even if the agent 
properly disclosed the principal, AgriSource could not have relied solely upon Johnson's 
statements; there would have to be a showing that the principal granted the agent the authority to 
perform the actions at issue. In this case, there is no showing by Johnson that he was the agent 
for Johnson Grain, Inc., there are no facts in the record indicating that Neil Brown or any other 
officer of Johnson Grain, Inc. gave Johnson authority to contract in the name of Johnson Grain, 
Inc. at the time the subject contract was entered into, and Johnson failed to object to the terms of 
the contract if Johnson believed that the contract should have been in the name of Johnson Grain, 
Inc. Pursuant to Idaho law, Johnson is personally liable to AgriSource for the damages incurred 
by AgriSource and summary judgment ,vas properly entered. 
The Trial Court Properlv Denied Johnson's Third Motion for Reconsideration 
The judgment in favor of AgriSource was certified as final on June 14,2012. R Vol. II, 
pp.288-291. On August 29,2012 Johnson filed his Third Motion for Reconsideration and 
Alternative Motion for Relief. R Vol. II, pp. 327a-327c. In the Third Motion, Johnson "moyes 
the court to reconsider its decision on summary judgment that AgriSource had no notice of 
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Robert Johnson's status as angst [sic] for Johnson Grain, Inc." R Vol. II, p. 327a. Johnson then 
filed an Amended Third Motion for Reconsideration which added an additional request for relief: 
"Further, Johnson moves the court to reconsider its Decision and Order filed September 7, 
2012." R Vol. II, p. 341. Included with Johnson's Third Motion was the Affidavit of Jeanne 
Harris, R Vol. II, p. 327d, and, with the Amended Third Motion, the Third Affidavit of Johnson, 
R Vol. II, p. 344. 
Contrary to Johnson's assertions, Johnson did not move the trial court to reconsider its 
decision on Johnson's Second Motion for Reconsideration. The Second Motion for 
Reconsideration was denied at hearing on the record on August 14,2012. Tr, pp. 38-75, as 
reflected in that Order on Motions for Costs and Attorney's Fees tIled August 21, 2012. R Vol. 
II, p. 314. The only "decision and order filed September 7,2012" was that decision and order 
granting a motion for reconsideration filed by Neil Brown. R Vol. II, p. 332. AgriSource \vas 
not involved in that decision and order. 
The trial court found that Johnson's Third Motion for Reconsideration was not 
permissible under LR.C .P. 11 (a)(2) and went on to hold that the Rule applies only to 
reconsideration of an interlocutory order and is not a vehicle for reconsideration of a final 
judgment. R Vol. II, p. 363. 
The Idaho Supreme Court recently addressed this issue. The court held that in a case 
involving a dismissal pursuant to LR.C.P. 40( c), the dismissal was "in effect a final judgment" 
and that therefore relief was not properly sought using l.R,C.P. 11(a)(2)(8). EbJ' 1', State, 148 
Idaho 731, 228 PJd 1998 (2010). 
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In an earlier case, the Idaho Court of Appeals analyzed whether a motion was properly 
brought under Rule 11 (a)(2)(B) and stated: "until a judgment has been entered or a certificate 
granted by the trial court pursuant to LR. c.P. 54(b), the order dismissing DSA' s counterclaim 
was not final and appealable" and went on to hold that the trial court should have considered a 
motion filed in that case as a motion to reconsider an interlocutory order and therefore properly 
brought pursuant LR.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B). Although not explicitly stated, it is clear from the 
decision that once a tInal judgment is entered it is no longer interlocutory and no longer subject 
to reconsideration pursuant to LR.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B). Noreen v. Price Development Co. Ltd. 
Partnership, 135 Idaho 816, 819-820, 25 P.3d 129,132-133 (Cl. App. 2001). 
In Dunlap v. Cassia A1emorial Hospital j\1edical Center, 134 Idaho 233, 235-236, 999 
P.2d 888,890-891 (2000), the Idaho Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that a summary 
judgment is not interlocutory once a final judgment is entered and that a motion for 
reconsideration of the judgment could not properly be considered. 
In addition to being an improper motion for reconsideration of a final order as found by 
the trial court, Johnson's Third Motion for Reconsideration was untimely. The judgment was 
certified as final on June 14,2012. The last day to file a motion for reconsideration was June 28, 
2012. Johnson filed the Third Motion for Reconsideration on August 29, 2012 and filed the 
Amended Third Motion for Reconsideration on September 11, 2012. 
l.R.c.P. 1 1 (a)(2)(B) states: 
A motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of the trial 
court may be made at any time before the entry of final judgment 
but not later than fourteen days after the entry of the final 
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judgment. A motion for reconsideration of any order of the trial 
court made after entry of final judgment may be filed within 
fourteen days from the entry of such order... 
At first blush, lohnson's argument is, in effect, that Johnson could continually file 
motions for reconsideration of orders denying motions for reconsideration and that the court 
would have to consider all affidavits and other evidence presented. This is contrary to the intent 
of the Rule. The interlocutory decision that Johnson was attempting to have the court reconsider 
by the filing of his motions was that Memorandum Decision and Order filed on April 6, 2012, 
granting summary judgment in favor of AgriSource. R Vol. II, p. 242. Pursuant to that decision 
a judgment in favor of AgriSource against Johnson was filed on April 17, 2012. R Vol. II, p. 
252. The judgment was certified as final on June 14,2012. R Vol. II, p. 288. An amended 
judgment that added an award of fees and costs was entered on August 21,2012. R Vol. II, p. 
312. 
Johnson did not file his Third Motion for Reconsideration until August 29,2012, well 
after certification of the judgment on June 14,2012. It would be improper for the court to 
consider multiple successive motions for reconsideration filed more than fourteen days after the 
entry of final judgment. 
Johnson argues that "the district cOUli did not consider whether its memorandum and 
order denying in part and f,'Tanting in part Johnson's Second Motion for Reconsideration was an 
order entered after final judgment that may be reconsidered upon timely motion under Rule 
1 1 (a)(2)(B)." Johnson's Briet~ p. 29. This argument assumes that Johnson requested that the 
trial court reconsider the court's decision on Johnson's Second Motion for Reconsideration. The 
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record shows that Johnson never requested that the court reconsider its decision on Johnson's 
Second Motion. 
In the Third Motion for Reconsideration, Johnson moved the court "to reconsider its 
decision on summary judgment that AgriSource had no notice of Robert Johnson's status as 
angst [sic] for Johnson Grain, Inc." R Vol. II, p. 327a. There is no mention in the Third Motion 
for Reconsideration of the court's decision denying Johnson's Second Motion for 
Reconsideration. 
In the Amended Third Motion for Reconsideration, Johnson moved the court "to 
reconsider its decision and order filed September 7,2012." R Vol. II, p. 34l. Again, there is no 
mention of the court's decision denying Johnson's Second Motion for Reconsideration, which 
was denied in open court on August 14,2012. Tr, pp. 38-75. 
If Johnson's Third Motion for Reconsideration was an attempt to have the court 
reconsider its decision on Johnson's Second Motion for Reconsideration, it was untimely under 
any interpretation of LR.C.P. 11 (a)(2). The Third Motion for Reconsideration was filed on 
August 29, 2012, more than fourteen (14) days after the certification of the judgment as final on 
June 14,2012 and more than fourteen (14) days after denial of Johnson's Second Motion for 
Reconsideration on August 14,2012. In addition, Johnson never asked for reconsideration of the 
court decision denying Johnson's Second Motion for Reconsideration. The court's denial of 
Johnson's Third Motion for Reconsideration was proper. 
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The Judgment Certified as Final on June 14,2012 is the Final Jud2:ment 
Johnson attempts to argue that the Amended Judgment entered by the Court on August 
21,2012 "was a final judgment requiring the District Court to once again certify the judgment as 
final." Johnson's Brief, p. 32. As to Johnson and AgriSource, the only difference between the 
Judgment entered June 14,2012 and certified as final, R Vol. II, p. 288, and the Amended 
Judgment entered on August 21,2012, R Vol. II, p. 312, was the addition of an award of 
attorney's fees and costs to AgriSource. Johnson's position that the August 21, 2012 Judgment 
was the final judgment, requiring another certification, is contrary to Idaho law. 
Although JorJ1son refers to the holding of an Idaho Supreme Court case as "dicta", 
Johnson's Brief, p. 32, the Court clearly stated its position concerning this issue: 
This court holds that the 42 day period to file a notice of appeal 
begins to run once an order is entered that resolves all issues, 
grants all relief to which the prevailing party is entitled other than 
attorney fees and costs, and brings to an end a lawsuit. 
Goodman Oil Co. v. Scotty's Duro-Bllilt Generator, Inc., 148 
Idaho 588, 591, 226 P.3d 530,533 (2010). (emphasis added). 
Johnson's position is also contrary to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. LR.C.P.54 
states that the judgment is "final if either it has been certified as final pursuant to subsection 
(b)( l) of this Rule or judgment has been entered on all claims for relief, except costs and fees, 
asserted by or against all parties in the action. (emphasis added). LR.C.P. 58(a) states: "The 
entry of judgment shall not be delayed for the taxing of costs." 
Johnson also argues that because counsel for AgriSource sent a letter and a proposed 
stipulation concerning certification of the amended judgment, AgriSource is judicially estopped 
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or otherwise estopped from asserting that the amended judgment need not be certified as final in 
order for it to become the final judgment. Johnson's Brief, pp. 33-34. Initially, AgriSource notes 
that AgriSource objected to the inclusion of the affidavit and attachments filed by Johnson on the 
grounds that they were not considered by the trial court in making its decisions and therefore 
should not be part of the record. See AgriSource's Unopposed Motion to Augment, Exhibit F. 
AgriSource also moved to remove the affidavit and attachments from the record on the same 
grounds. See AgriSource's Motion to Delete From the Record. 
An examination ofthe documents submitted by Johnson show that the stipulation was 
never signed by all parties to the action, it was never filed with the court except as an attachment 
to Johnson's counsel's affidavit, and no order was entered pursuant to the stipulation. R Vol. II, 
pp.379-386. 
In support of his assertion, Johnson cites Garner v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho 430, 80 P.3d 
1031 (2003), without citing any specific pages in that case. An examination of the Garner case 
shows that judicial estoppel is not mentioned in that case. 
If the C01.ni considers Johnson's counsel's brief and attachments, it is clear that the 
doctrine of judicial estoppel does not apply to this case. Judicial estoppel applies when a litigant 
\vho obtains a judgment, advantage, or consideration from one party through means of sworn 
statements is judicially estopped from adopting inconsistent and contrary allegations or 
testimony, to obtain a recovery or a right against another pmiy, arising out of the same 
transaction or subject matter. Lomis v. Church, 76 Idaho 87, 93-94, P.2d 561, 565 (1954). 
The policies underlying judicial estoppel are general considerations of the orderly administration 
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of justice and regard for the dignity of judicial proceedings. Judicial estoppel is intended to 
prevent a litigant from playing fast and loose with the courts. Heinze v. Bauer, 145 Idaho 232, 
235, 178 P.3d 597, 600 (2008). 
Johnson's reliance upon the doctrine of judicial estoppel is misguided. In this case 
Johnson has failed to establish any s\vorn statement of AgriSource or AgriSource's counsel that 
allo\ved AgriSource to obtain a judgment, advantage, or consideration from Johnson. At best, 
the statements contained in counsel's letter were a mistake oflaw concerning the finality of the 
judgment certified on June 14, 2012, and Johnson has made no showing of a sworn statement or 
that AgriSource obtained any advantage or consideration as a result of the letter and proposed 
stipulation. 
Johnson's argument that the addition of an award of attorney's fees and costs, as 
described in the Amended Judgment, somehow extended Johnson's filing deadlines and the 
finality of the judgment is misplaced in light of the provisions of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure and this Court's holding in Goodman Oil. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED JOHNSON'S MOTION FOR RELIEF 
FROM JUDGMENT 
Johnson asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when denying Johnson's Motion 
for Relief from Judt,'111ent pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b)(2), (3), and/or (6). R Vol. II, p. 327a. In 




LR. C.P. 60(b) allows the court to relieve a party from a final judgment, order or 
proceeding for certain specified reasons. The reasons cited by Johnson were: (2) newly 
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for 
a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud, whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic, 
misrepresentation, or other misconduct or other misconduct of an adverse party; (6) any other 
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. 
In denying this motion, the trial court found that Johnson did not establish that the newly 
discovered evidence was not previously discoverable by due diligence. R Vol. II, p. 365. On 
appeal, Johnson asserts "Harris testified she \vould not have provided her evidence earlier." 
Johnson's Brief, p. 35. In reality, Harris, in paragraph 31 of her Affidavit, stated "Until about 10 
days ago I have not volunteered any infOlmation to Rob and I have been reluctant to tell anyone 
about mv knowledge." R Vol. II, p. 327 g. 
Johnson made no showing that he did not know about the existence of Jeanne Harris. In 
fact, Harris stated in her Affidavit that she began working at the grain elevator approximately two 
weeks after Johnson began working there. R Vol. II, p. 327e. Johnson also stated that he knew 
Harris was Neil Brown's bookkeeper and maintained records for Neil Brown's businesses. R 
Vol. II, p. 345. Although Ms. Harris may have been "reluctant" to discuss the situation with 
anyone, Johnson made no showing of why he did not subpoena her and take her deposition. As 
the trial court found: 'There is nothing to indicate that Harris could not have been subpoenaed 
and required to sit for a deposition, even if she was unwilling to voluntarily provide infOlmation. 
There was ample time for Johnson to discover Hanis' relevant knowledge." R Vol. II, p. 365. 
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Johnson also argues that because the trial court did not address the Third Affidavit of 
Johnson, the court abused its discretion. However, a review of the trial court's Memorandum 
Decision shows that the court recognized that Johnson's Third Motion relied upon the Third 
Affidavit of Johnson. R Vol. II, p. 360. If the trial court committed an error in failing to analyze 
the Third Affidavit of Johnson, the error is harmless when one considers the statements made in 
the Affidavit and the fact that most of the statements would be inadmissible. 
In the Statement ofthe Facts, AgriSource reviewed the various assertions made by 
Johnson concerning this Third Affidavit and that Johnson, in his brief, has misstated the 
statements contained in the Affidavit. There is nothing set forth in the Third Affidavit of 
Johnson that would support a claim for relief pursuant to LR.C.P. 60(b). In addition, the Third 
Affidavit of Johnson and the Affidavit of Harris do not comply with the provisions of LR.C.P. 
56( e) that requires all affidavits be made on personal knowledge, set forth facts as would be 
admissible into evidence, and show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the 
matters stated therein. AgriSource filed an objection to these affidavits on this basis. See 
AgriSource's Unopposed );lotion to Augment, Exhibit D, pp. 5-6. 
The Affiday'it of Harris does not set forth any conversation that Harris had with any 
representative of AgriSource. As pointed out in the Statement of the Facts, the Harris Affidavit 
confirms that all checks made by AgriSource were made out to "Johnson Grain", not Johnson 
Grain, Inc. Almost all of the Affidavit of Harris pertains to dealings between herself, Johnson, 
and Neil BrO\vn. 
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The Third Affidavit of Johnson describes office procedures conducted by Harris without 
laying foundation for those statements. Most of the Affidavit has nothing to do with Johnson's 
dealings with AgriSource but rather addresses Johnson's dealings with Neil Brown and are not 
relevant to the issue before the court. Johnson's primary argument is that, in a conclusory 
fashion, he states that "copies of train car logs and copies of the scale tickets would be provided 
to AgriSource." and "I believe that invoice was sent to AgriSource, Inc." R Vol. II, p. 346. 
Johnson makes no attempt to state when these documents were provided or sent to AgriSource or 
how the documents were provided or sent to AgriSource. Johnson attempts to tie one invoice to 
a check paid by AgriSource but is unable to do so - the amount of the invoice differs from the 
amount of any check that Johnson could produce. 
~When mling upon Johnson's claim pursuant to l.R.C.P. 60(b)(3) the court found that the 
record did not support a claim of fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct on the part of 
AgriSource. Johnson does not address this finding, nor is there any evidence in the record to 
contradict the finding of the court. 
Addressing I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6), the trial court found that Johnson did not establish the 
requisite unique and compelling circumstances to support relief under that section. R Vol. II, p. 
365. Johnson does not address this finding, nor is there any evidence in the record to contradict 
the finding of the court. 
v\lhen revie\ving the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for relief, the comi must examine: (1) 
whether the trial court conectly perceived the issue as one of discretion: (2) whether the ilial 
comi acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards 
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applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its 
decision by an exercise of reason. 
In this matter, the trial court clearly recognized that it perceived the issue as one of 
discretion: "A decision to grant or to deny a motion for reconsideration generally rests in the 
sound discretion of the trial court." R Vol. II, p. 360. The court perfonned a thorough analysis 
of the cases that set out the factors the court should consider when considering relief under 
I.R.C.P.60(b). R Vol. II, pp. 2-4. The court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and 
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the motion. Finally, the court applied the case 
law to the assertions of Johnson and, by exercising reason, denied Johnson's motion for relief. 
Johnson attempts to argue that the trial court failed to explain its decision process or 
identify why Johnson \vas not entitled to relief. Johnson's Brief, p. 36. However, it is clear from 
a review of the court's decision that the court explained its decision process and explicitly stated 
why Johnson was not entitled to relief. 
Johnson asselis "A timely motion under Rule 60(b) requires the district court to examine 
the evidence presented, rule on its admissibility, and issue a ruling based on analysis of that 
evidence." Johnson's Brief, p. 36. In support of this proposition, Johnson cites (\vithout 
reference to a page number) Davt'son v. Cheyovich Family Trust, 149 Idaho 375, 234 P.3d 699 
(2010). Johnson's assertion is a misstatement of the holding of the Dmvsol1 case. 
In Dmrson, the trial comi failed to rule on a 60(b)( 6) motion. The Idaho Supreme Comi 
held that by failing to issue a ruling on the motion, the trial court ened. id., 149 Idaho 375, 380, 
234 P .3d 699, 704. That is not the situation in this case. The trial court, in its decision, analyzed 
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applicable case law and the motion and affidavits filed by Johnson and made a ruling. The ruling 
of the trial court complied with the Berg standard. The court properly denied Johnson's Motion 
for Relief from Judgment 
JOHNSON IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN A'VARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Johnson requests an award attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3) on the 
grounds that the underlying transaction is a commercial transaction and "where AgriSource 
contends a contract exists with Johnson." Johnson's Brief, p. 37. 
Even if Johnson prevails on appeal, whether Johnson is the prevailing party would still 
need to be determined. Johnson is requesting that the final judgment and amended judgment be 
vacated and the case be remanded to the District Court for further proceedings on the claims 
between Johnson and AgtiSource. 10hnson's Brief: p. 38. If the judgment is vacated, the 
determination of a prevailing party would not be made until further proceedings take place before 
the trial court. 
If 10hnson's appeal is denied, AgriSource would be the prevailing party and entitled to an 
award of attorney's fees as set forth in this Brief. 
CONCLUSION 
10hnson did not establish any facts that an actual agency relationship exited between 
10hnson and Johnson Grain, Inc. Further, ifJohnson was an agent for 10hnson Grain, Inc., 
10hnson failed to properly disclose the existence of the agency to AgriSource. The existence of 
agency and the authority or the apparent authority of an agent cannot be established solely by the 
statements of the purported agent. 
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There are no material issues of fact in this case that would preclude the granting of 
summary judgment. The trial court properly granted summary judgment and properly denied 
Johnson's three motions for reconsideration and motion for relief from judgment. 
The appeal of Johnson should be denied, and AgriSource should be awarded its attorney's 
fees incurred in the defense of the appeal. 
Dated tlliS;<~day of 11 ~ud-:20 13. 
~l££t v. ent Fletcher 
Attorney for AgriSource 
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